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PROBABILISTIC CAUSALITY AND IDEALIZATION
José Luis Rolleri
Universidad Autónoma de Querétaro, México
Abstract
The main aim of this paper is to provide some probabilistic notions on 
causality proposed to be applied to the nomic statements which intend to 
give account of the indeterministic processes within the domain of a scientific 
theory. In general, such statements are, in more or less extent, idealized 
statements which rest on a variety of unrealistic suppositions. I try to show 
how the probability distribution over the final states of an indeterministic 
process changes accordingly as the nomic statement in question is de-
idealized by means of addition of the causally relevant factors. In order to 
illustrate the study I take few nomic statements from population genetics. 
Besides, in the course, I attempt to contrast the ideas embraced here with 
some of the notions of Humphreys´ ontic conceptions of causality and 
explanation, which are contrary to the epistemic view adopted here about 
those subjects. 
Keywords: Probabilistic causality; indeterministic process; idealized laws; 
concretization; probabilistic explanation. 
Causalidad probabilista e idealización
Resumen
El propósito principal de este artículo consiste en proveer algunas nociones 
probabilistas sobre la causalidad, propuestas para aplicarlas a enunciados 
nómicos que pretenden dar cuenta de procesos indeterministas en el dominio 
de una teoría científica. En general, tales enunciados son, en menor o 
mayor grado, enunciados idealizados que descansan sobre una variedad 
de suposiciones irrealistas. Intento mostrar cómo cambia la distribución de 
probabilidad sobre los estados finales de un proceso indeterminista en la 
medida que el enunciado nómico en consideración se desidealiza por medio 
de la adición de factores causalmente relevantes. Para ilustrar el estudio 
considero unos cuantos enunciados nómicos de la genética de poblaciones. 
Además, en el curso, pretendo contrastar las ideas aquí elaboradas 
con algunas nociones de las concepciones ónticas de la causalidad y la 
explicación debidas a Humphreys que son contrarias al enfoque epistémico 
que adopto sobre esas temáticas. 
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idealizadas; concretización; explicación probabilista.
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PROBABILISTIC CAUSALITY AND IDEALIZATION
José Luis Rolleri
Universidad Autónoma de Querétaro, México
Introduction
Most of the philosophers who have dealt with the issue of probabilistic 
causality have analyzed simple statements of the form P(A ⎸B) > P(A) −
given an implicit class of reference. Since the classic monograph by Patrick 
Suppes, A Probabilistic Theory of Causality (1970), the main idea of this 
kind of theories has been that the occurrence of event B rise the probability 
of occurrence of event A (see, for example, Rosen 1982-83, Eells & Sober 
1983, Eells (1980), Salmon (1980) and Davis 1988). Suppes introduce, first, 
the notion of prima facie cause as following: “The event Bt´ is a prima facie 
cause of the event At if and only if P(At ⎸ Bt´) > P(At), where P(Bt´) > 0 and 
t´ < t.” (1970, p. 12). Then, he defines the genuine causes as those that are 
not spurious. An event Bt´ is a spurious cause in sense one of At if and only 
if event Bt´ is a prima facie cause of the At and there is an event Ct´´ such 
that P(At ⎸Bt´ Ct´´ ) = P(At ⎸Ct´´) and P(At ⎸Bt´ Ct´´ ) ≥ P(At ⎸Bt´), where P(Bt´ 
Ct´´) > 0 and t´´ < t´. (1970, p. 23). 
The former notions allow for deterministic cases, where the value 
of probability assigned to statements as P(At ⎸Bt´) equals the unity and, 
consequently, any other different event ⎼A has probability zero. This 
conforms with the following Suppes´ definition: “An event Bt´ is a sufficient 
(or determinate) cause of At if and only if Bt´ is a prima facie cause of At and 
P(At ⎸Bt´) = 1.” (1970, p. 34). I consider deterministic cases uninteresting 
for a conception of probabilistic causality. From a deterministic Laplaceana 
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view of the physical word, probability statements are the expression of our 
ignorance of the real causes, and they lack of any objective reference to 
the world itself. Thus probabilities have not an objective character and it is 
worthless to apply them to indeterministic processes.
The philosophical relevant cases are those where the causes are not 
sufficient or determinate, where P(At ⎸Bt´) < 1. This accord with Suppes´ 
remark about the application of his probabilistic notions on causality: “There 
are at least three different kinds of conceptual frameworks within which it 
seems appropriate to make causal claims. […] One conceptual framework 
is that provided by a particular scientific theory…” (1970, p. 13), and 
elsewhere: “… when one analyzes the formal character of a theory that is 
formulated as a class of stochastic processes.” (1984, p. 52).
Furthermore, the authors referred do not take into account that the laws 
of the scientific theories, in less or more extent, are idealized statements, 
statements that are formulated under a variety of unrealistic suppositions 
and, hence, are satisfied only in ideal systems ―such as frictionless 
pendulum, material bodies as masses concentrated at extensionless points, 
inertial bodies free of acceleration, rigid bodies, perfectly elastic spheres, 
potential wells and harmonic oscillators systems, which do not exist in 
nature―, simply they overlook this issue. In order to apply the idealized 
laws of science to the world it become necessary first to ‘de-idealize’ them, 
to eliminate the unrealistic suppositions by means of Leszek Nowak´s 
method of concretization (1992), and Ernan McMullin´s procedure of de-
idealization (1985).
The main aim of this paper is to provide some probabilistic notions on 
indeterministic causality or, alternatively, notions on probabilistic causality 
proposed to be applies to the nomic statements which intent to give account 
of the indeterministic processes in the domain of a scientific theory. The 
nomic or likelaw statements involved are generally, in more or less extent, 
idealized statements. Therefore the statements to study are, in first instance, 
of the general form: P(S(x) ⎸d(x), R(x), U(x)), where x stand for a system, 
S(x) for a class of final states of x, d(x) for certain initial state of x, R(x) for 
some realistic physical conditions that make possible the elements of S(x), 
and U(x) for some unrealistic suppositions. P is thus a probability distribution 
over S(x) conditional to d(x) given R(x) and U(x). I try to show how the 
probability distribution over S(x) changes according to the nomic statement 
in question is de-idealize by means of the addition of causally relevant 
factors. Besides, in the course, I attempt to contrast the ideas embraced 
here with some of the notions of Paul Humphreys´ ontic conceptions of 
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causality and explanation, which are contrary to the epistemic view adopted 
here about those subjects. 
Idealized Laws
Stochastic processes
Let us begin with some ontological notions. A process is a transformation 
that a system undergoes from an initial state to a final state. An indeterministic 
process is a process in which, given an initial state, it is physically possible 
that two, several or many final states occur, which can be correlated, without 
determine any one. A stochastic process is an indeterministic process in 
which the two or many final states exclude each other. Furthermore, let it 
assume that the systems within the domain of application of a theory are 
described or depicted by a set of concepts which refers to magnitudes or 
qualitative features, which I will call here ‘factors’. At the same time, the 
laws or nomic statements of the theory are formulated in terms of such 
factors. We can say that for each system of certain specific kind there is a 
special law or a nomic statement of the theory that prescribe the possible 
transformations that the system could undergo. 
The issues to discuss forward are, on the one hand, whether the factors 
that occur in the formulation of a law, nomic statement, or principle of a 
theory are realistic or idealized factors and, on the other hand, whether 
such factors are causal or not. If a given law is an idealized law, without 
any realistic factor in its formulation, then it is inapplicable as such to any 
system, and one is unable to consider if its factors play a causal role, or if 
the law is a causal law, or if a given process in its domain is a causal process, 
and so on. In this way, it becomes necessary, in the first place, to de-idealize 
the laws in order to inquire about causal matters. 
Generally, the laws or principles of science are formulated incompletely, 
as Nowak point out, in terms of some realistic or feasible factors and 
presupposing some idealized or abstracted factors. As we will see, the de-
idealization and concretization of a nomic statement by means of inclusion of 
the factors previously omitted changes the probability distribution, assigning 
new transformation probabilities to the system from a given initial state to 
possible final states. In fact, as we will see later with an example, the whole 
formulae change, even its mathematical form.
Nowak´s method of concretization
The notions of idealization and abstraction, and the inverse notions of 
de-idealization and concretization, are explained in rough terms as follows. 
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Nowak distinguishes, among several notions of idealization, which he calls 
paradigms of idealization, the following two: “The neo-Lebnizian paradigm. 
Idealization is a deliberate falsification which never attempts to be more than 
truthlike. An idealizational statement is a special type of a counterfactual 
which has to do with what goes on at possible worlds given by the antecedent 
of the statement.”, and the neo-Hegelian paradigm, which is the concept of 
idealization that he endorses: “[…] it refers to Hegel´s idea that idealization 
(“abstraction”) consists in focusing on what is essential in a phenomena and 
in separating the essence from the appearance of the phenomenon.” (1992, 
pp. 9-10) The former concept refers to what is mostly considered as a proper 
idealization under the name of Galilean idealization. For example, Ernan 
McMullin says that: “The term ‘idealization’ itself is a rather loose one. I 
shall take it to signify a deliberate simplifying of something complicated 
(a situation, a concept, etc.) with a view to achieving at least at a partial 
understanding of that thing. It may involve a distortion of the original or it 
can simply mean a leaving on the remaining one.” (1985, p. 248). 
The second concept of idealization, the neo-Hegelian abstraction, 
devoid of its metaphysical expression, designs the procedure of selection of 
some relevant factors or parameters in order to, let us say, explain a kind of 
physical process because one can consider them as either causal, influencing 
factors or as other explanatory reason. Indeed, it refers to the Aristotelian 
concept of abstraction, to which Nancy Cartwright wrote: “[…] I should 
like to reserve the word ‘abstraction’ to pick out a more Aristotelian notion, 
where ‘abstraction’ means ‘taking away’ or ‘subtraction’. For Aristotle, we 
begin with a concrete particular complete with all its properties. We then 
strip away ―in our imagination― all that is irrelevant to the concerns of 
the moment to focus on some single property or set of properties, ‘as if they 
were separate’.” (1989, p. 197).
Nowak draws a distinction between both concepts: “Roughly, 
abstraction consists in a passage from properties AB to A, idealization 
consists in a passage from AB to A-B.” (2000, p. 8). In both cases, the 
property A has been selected but in the passage of abstraction the property 
B is simply subtracted, whereas in the passage of idealization the property 
B is negated or, more likely, distorted. Thus, abstraction embraces two 
tasks: pick out some properties and omit other properties. In contrast, in 
an idealizational passage, a property is indeed distorted, so the idealization 
of an object or system does not consist in just picking out some properties 
but also in simplifying, deliberately or not, by guessing a distortion in the 
object or system. 
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For sake of clarity let us say that in both idealization and in abstraction 
some unrealistic suppositions are involved. In the former the suppositions 
are rather counterfactual assumptions whereas in the latter the suppositions 
are counter-actual assumptions. This distinction between two types of 
unrealistic suppositions corresponds roughly to Nowak distinction between 
the neo-Leibnizian and neo-Hegelian paradigms. 
According to Nowak, the properties subtracted or negated can generate 
counter-actual statements by means of the introduction of idealizing 
conditions of the form p(x) = 0. This procedure can render law-like 
statements which Nowak calls idealizational: “An idealizational statement 
is a conditional possessing an idealizational condition in its antecedent” 
(1992, p. 11). The procedure of concretization, in Nowak´s sense, consists 
of removing that condition and replacing it with its realistic negation, and 
introducing a correction in the formulae (consequent) of the statement (see 
Nowak 1992). In this manner, the concretization procedure leads to a more 
realistic statement than the initial idealizational statement.
More explicitly, according to Nowak, in order to formulate a law which 
allows us to determinate the value of some magnitude F, a researcher selects 
some factors H which he considers principal for the process or phenomenon 
under consideration and makes an idealizational hypothesis by postulating a 
functional relationship f between the magnitude F and the principal factors H, 
which is the formulae occurring in the consequent of the law-like statement. 
Some other secondary factors p, with values equal to 0, are attached into the 
antecedent of that statement by the researcher. The result is an idealizational 
and counter-actual law of the form: 
If G(x) & p1(x) = 0 &…& pk(x) = 0 then F(x) = fk(H1(x),…, Hn(x)), where 
G(x) stands for a realistic and actual condition. (cfr. Nowak, 2000, p. 9).
Basically, Nowak thought of a sequence of statements which leads to a 
final factual statement via the procedure of concretization, this is to say, by 
means of elimination, step by step from 1 to k, of the idealizing conditions in 
the antecedent, restoring its realistic versions, and consequently, introducing 
a modification in the functional formulae in the consequent. Ideally this 
procedure of de-idealization of a law-like statement has as a final stage a 
statement of the form:
If G(x) & p1(x) ≠ 0 &…& pk(x) ≠ 0 then F(x) = f0(H1(x),…, Hn(x), pk(x),…, 
p1(x)), which lack of any idealizing conditions and is a factual statement 
(Nowak, 2000, pp. 9-10).
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Also, Nowak adds an approximation procedure. He initiates with this 
right remark: “Normally, however, final concretization is not met in science. 
Normally, after introducing some corrections the procedure of approximation 
is being applied. That is, all idealizing conditions are removed at once and 
their joint influence is assessed as responsible for the deviations up to certain 
threshold ε.” (1992, p. 12).
Let us briefly discuss the former notions. As we have remarked, in his 
notion of an idealizing condition Nowak confuses subtracted and distorted 
properties. That is, in the formulation of the antecedent of an idealization 
law, Nowak does not distinguish between an idealizing condition derived 
from a neo-Leibnizian idealization (a deliberate falsification) and an 
idealizing condition resulting from a neo-Hegelian abstraction (which 
separates the essence from the appearance). In other words, he fails to 
differentiate counterfactual suppositions, distinctive of idealization, and 
counter-actual suppositions, peculiar of abstraction. Consequently, Nowak 
mingles a combination of de-idealizing steps and concretization steps. In the 
following example, he considers the frictionless supposition as an idealizing 
condition and the inverse procedure as a case of concretization: suppose 
that a system is a classical body in free fall, then the concretization step 
would consist in moving from the statement ‘if ff(x) & R(x) = 0 then s(x) = 
1/2gt2’ to the statement ‘if ff(x) & R(x) = r then s(x) = 1/2gt2 – r’, where R 
stands for the medium resistance (see 2000, p. 8). Perhaps, it would be fair 
to say that the missing friction factor is just a subtracted feature instead of 
an idealized feature. 
Thus, in the context of the explicit and full formulation of the law-
like statements by Nowak, it will be better to say that (i) if the unrealistic 
supposition in the antecedent is counterfactual (a distortion) then the addition 
of a correction factor in the consequent is a de-idealizing act, and (ii) if the 
unrealistic supposition in the antecedent is a counter-actual (a subtraction) 
then the addition of a correction factor in the consequent is a concretization 
procedure.
Let us reformulate in a double sense the former Nowak´s ideas. First, we 
can transform a logical conditional statement into a probabilistic conditional 
statement in the obvious manner: Simply we convert A ⟶ C into P(C ⎸A). 
Second, for simplicity, we consider for a system x three sets (no empty) 
of suppositions: R(x) for realistic suppositions, C(x) for counterfactual 
suppositions, and A(x) for counter-actual suppositions, in order to formulate 
probabilistic idealized law-like statements as P(S(x) ⎸R(x), C(x), A(x)). Each 
of the previous sets corresponds to some factors: fR for realistic factors, fC 
for idealized factors and, fA for abstracted factors, respectively.
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It is worth noting that if, by a step of concretization, a counter-actual 
supposition is eliminated, then a more realistic and specified nomic statement 
is obtained, a statement of the form: P(S(x) ⎸d(x), fR(x), fC(x) = 0, fA(x) ≠ 
0), where the probability distribution P varies in virtue of the inclusion 
of the factor fA previously abstracted. Similarly, if in a further step, an 
idealized supposition is removed by means of the de-idealization procedure, 
one obtains a nomic statement less idealized and more specified of the 
form: P(S(x) ⎸d(x), fR(x), fC(x) ≠ 0, fA(x) ≠ 0), where again the probability 
distribution has changed in function of the addition of the factor fC formerly 
idealized.
In short, until now we have considered three cases. Let s(x) in S(x) be 
a possible final state of the system x undergoing an indeterministic process 
from an initial state d(x). Then:
P´(S(x) = r ⎸d(x), fR(x), fC(x) = 0, fA(x) = 0)
P´(s(x) = r´ ⎸d(x), fR(x), fC(x) = 0, fA(x) ≠ 0)
P´´ (s(x) = r´´ ⎸d(x), fR(x), fC(x) ≠ 0, fA(x) ≠ 0),
These three probabilistic statements assign to s(x) different values 
because the probability distributions have change as a function of the addition 
of relevant factors earlier omitted. As we will see above, the probability 
values of every s(x) in S(x) could increase or decrease in function of the 
factor included.
For our study, it is worth noting that at the extent one obtain a 
probabilistic lawlike statement free of some idealizations and abstractions, 
the corresponding probability values for the final states of the system respond 
to more realistic and specified conditions in which the indeterministic 
process in consideration happens. This means that one could obtain objective 
probability values and, we can say, relatively to the theory to which the 
lawlike statement belongs, the right or correct values of probability. But that 
is all we can intend. We cannot aim to obtain the exact values, because in 
science there are not nomic statements free of all idealization and abstraction, 
and in every case, a threshold ε corresponding to a range of approximation 
should be introduced.  
Nevertheless, it is clear that at the extent that we are able to de-
idealize the probabilistic lawlike statements, we could get better and fuller 
explanations of indeterministic processes. 
 A case of application: Hardy-Weinberg´s equilibrium principle 
Let us illustrate the former ideas with the case of a principle of 
population genetics:
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Suppose that Aa is a pair of Mendelian characters, A being dominant, and 
that in any given generation the numbers of pure dominants (AA), hete-
rozygotes (Aa), and pure recessives (aa) are as p : 2q : r. Finally, suppose 
that the numbers are fairly large, so that the mating may be regarded as 
random, that the sexes are evenly distributed among the three varieties, 
and that all are equally fertile. A little mathematics […] is enough to show 
that in the next generation the numbers will be as (p + q)2 : 2(p + q) (q + r) 
: (q + r)2. (Hardy, 1908, p. 49).
Furthermore, Hardy notes that such proportions are theoretical because 
they rest on several ideal conditions. If the generations are discrete, those 
proportions remain constant, or better, in equilibrium –stables, said Hardy− 
indefinitely, and neither a dominant character should show a tendency to 
spread over a whole population, nor a recessive should tend to die out, at 
least they were being altered by some external force. 
Niles Eldredge takes into account four factors which can produce 
genetic changes: “G. H. Hardy y W. Weinberg, had established that such 
allelic frequencies are destined to remain constant (the Hardy-Weinberg 
equilibrium) unless and until disrupted by immigration, mutation [a 
spontaneous and random change in DNA duplication], natural selection 
[process of differential reproduction of genes or genotypes, and the results 
of this process] or non-random- mating behavior.” (Eldredge, 1999, p. 125).
There is a consensus among evolutionary biologists that the factors 
that alters the previous principle are those that violate the following 
suppositions: 1) Mating is random, 2) The alleles (one of two or more 
alternative expressions of a gene), genes (units of inheritance affecting 
the characteristics of a trait) and genotypes (the genetic makeup of an 
individual) show no difference in fitness (measure of the relative success 
of one genotype compared to other genotypes), that is, selection in not in 
operation at this locus, 3) There is not gene flow (the spread of alleles through 
a population or species as a result of successful interbreeding), that is, there 
is not migrations of genes from one population into another, 4) Mutation is 
absent or so negligible that the allele copy numbers remain constant, and 5) 
Populations size is effectively infinite, so there is not genetic drift (events 
wherein some alleles spread in a population as a result of random actions 
rather than a consequence of natural selection). (see Avers, 1989, p. 254). 
Of course, such suppositions are counterfactual or, in the best case, 
counter-actual. Mutations and natural selections are the fundamental 
factors of genetic changes and evolution. Their omission represents a high 
idealization, which are indeed counterfactual. The other three suppositions 
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–random mating, not genetic flow and not genetic drift− can be considered 
counter-actual because although they do not actually happen in nature, it is 
possible that they could happen.
Let p and q be, with p + q = 1, the frequencies values of alleles A and 
a in a given locus, respectively. Then by the formulae p2 + 2pq + q2 = 1 
one can get the proportions of the three genotypes AA, Aa and aa. If, for 
example, the frequencies of both alleles are equal, one obtain that for the 
next generation the values of the proportions of the former genotypes are 
¼, ½, and ¼, respectively. This is elemental: the basic form of the HWP.
Now, we can reformulate the HWP as a nomic probabilistic statement, 
in Nowak´s style −where fR stand for the frequencies values of alleles A and 
a, MA mating system, M for migration, μ for mutation, and S for selection−, 
in the following manner: 
(p2AA + 2pqAa + q2aa = 1⃒ fR, MA = 0, M = 0, μ = 0, S = 0)
A step of concretization of this formula removing the unrealistic 
suppositions of random system of mating, change the probability distribution 
on the three genotypes involved. Suppose an assortative mating where similar 
organisms tend to choose each other as mates. Then the HWP is modified as: 
(p2 + pq/2)AA + pqAa + (q2 + pq/2)aa = 1
Thus, given that the frequencies values of alleles are equal, the 
probability distribution varies, and one obtains the values 3/8, 1/4, and 3/8 
for the three genotypes, respectively (see Sober, 2000, pp. 3-4). 
The probabilistic formulation, for example, for the heterozygote 
genotype is:
(P(Aa) =1/4 ⃒ f(A) = f(a) = 1/2, AS, M = 0, μ = 0, s = 0),where AM means 
assortative mating. 
Note that these mating system increases the probability of both 
homozygotes (individuals carrying identical alleles for a trait) genotypes 
while decrease the probability of the heterozygote (individuals carrying two 
different alleles for the same trait) genotype. 
A step of de-idealization eliminating in this case the counterfactual 
suppositions of selection factors also missing, modifies the basic version 
of HWP. In order to do that we must introduce a selection coefficient (the 
proportional reduction of the contribution of gametes in comparison to the 
standard genotype) as Elizabeth Lloyd does (1984, p. 247). She presents a 
model to predict (in an ideal system) the probabilities of the three genotypes 
after selection, in the case of simple dominance when the fitness of genotypes 
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AA and Aa equals 1 and the fitness of aa is (1 – s). Lloyd use the following 
formulae:
p2AA + 2pqAa + (1 – s)q2aa = 1 – sq2
Applying that formulae, the probability of the recessive genotype 
decrease:
 (P(aa) = sq2 ⎸f(a) = r < 0.5, MS = 0, M = 0, μ = 0, S ≠ 0)
Again, as we can see, what is modified with the introduction of a factor 
previously idealized is the distribution of probability.
Finally, let us remove the contrafactual suppositions which omit 
mutations. Suppose that in a given locus with two alleles A and a, a 
spontaneous mutation (a change in a DNA nucleoids sequence) takes place, 
and generate a new allele α: In a single generation certain amount of allele 
A converts to allele α. This refers to a mutation per gene per generation with 
a rate μ which varies in function of the variation of the amount of allele A. 
Thus, in an initial generation G1 a percentage μ of allele A, μA, convert to 
the new allele α, with a value r in such a way that we obtain p1A = pA – r y 
α = r. Let the mutation rate remain constant in n discrete generations. In a 
k generation, with 1 < k ≤ n, we have: 
pk
2 + qk2 + rk2 + 2pkqk + 2pkrk + 2qkrk = 1, where pk = pk-1 – μA, qk = qk-1 y rk = 
rk-1 + μA. 
The inclusion of the new mutant allele modified the simple form of the 
HWP. This means that in the corresponding probabilistic formulation the null 
value of mutation is eliminated and the equality is replaced by the formed 
equation which contain the r value for the α allele frequency. In this case, 
the class S(x) of final state of the system x has also changed.
In the case of the Hardy-Weinberg principle we have seen that its 
formulation requires some realistic conditions −such as populations of 
diploids (full normal number of characteristic somatic cell chromosomes) 
organisms with sexual reproduction, the sexes are evenly distributed among 
the three varieties, and all are equally fertile− and that its application needs 
de-idealize its original formulation via the elimination of some unrealistic 
suppositions, the addition of some corresponding relevant factor, and a 
reformulation of its basis equation. In each and every case of this sort the 
probability distribution changes.
One can realize that the genotypes and, consequently, the respective 
phenotypes (the realized expressions of the genotypes and of environmental 
influence) of diploids organisms with sexual reproduction are the results of 
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multiple and diverse relevant factors such as mating system, natural selection, 
mutation, and migration. One could construct several models according to 
those of the former factor −and other like an infertility rate− one takes into 
account. Those models could be mathematically complex, and each one 
provides to the genotypes involved different values of probability. One could 
think that the complete model, which incorporate all the relevant factors, 
give us the correct values of probability of the genotypes. However this is 
relative to the present theory of biological evolution. We cannot assume 
that the contemporary theory of evolution of species, including population 
genetics, is the complete theory of the living world. All that we can ask is 
whether in a given model, the probability distribution is correct according 
with our present biological knowledge. But forget about the true values! 
Casual processes
Until now, I have avoided deliberately to considerate whether the 
previous factors are causal or not. In relation to the generation of genotypes 
―and, thus, phenotypes― the factors involved are mutations during the 
processes of replication and recombination of genes containing inside the 
parent gametes (reproductive cells carrying only half of the complement 
of the organisms’ chromosomes) On the one hand, mutations, as genetic 
processes that can generate novel genotypes and innovative variations, 
are random in nature and occur spontaneously, without a cause. On the 
other hand, recombination is a process where the parent’s genes are 
combined at random giving place to novel zygotes. The importance of 
this is fundamental because it signifies that chance plays a crucial role in 
evolution: the production of genetic variation, over which natural selection 
works. We can verify in the pertinent literature that the remainder kinds of 
processes ―natural selection, mating system, migration, and others― are 
considered in general by the evolutionary biologists as causal processes that 
may produce evolutionary changes (see Avers 1989, Ayala 2012, Eldredge 
1998, Lewontin et al 1999, Gould 2002, and Mayr 1991). 
My general view on this issue consist in, roughly, that deeming a 
factor, variable or condition as causal is a matter of the whole conceptual 
framework which one adopt or of the global scientific theory one apply. As 
Suppes points out: “It is important to emphasize that the determination of a 
causal relationship between events or kinds of events is always relative to 
some conceptual framework.” (1970, p. 13). This entails that, in the field of 
science, anyone is able to say that there is a causal process of certain kind 
in nature, independently of any theoretic framework. This thesis, which for 
someone could seem a truism because we cannot say how the world is in an 
67
Jo
sé
 L
u
is
 R
o
ll
er
i
absolute sense, stand against some ontic theories of causality, in opposition 
to epistemic theories.
In any case, we can advance some causal notions in order to elucidate 
what probabilistic causes could be in the previous example from population 
genetics. First of all, we should assume that the realistic factors make possible 
each of the final states in S(x) of a given system, this is to say, for any s(x) 
in S(x), P(s(x) ⎸d(x), R(x)) > 0. In the case of the HWP, S(x) is the set of 
the three genotypes {AA, Aa, aa}, d(x) is a given probability values for the 
alleles A and a, and R(x) is a set of suppositions about a population such as 
the organisms are diploids with sexual reproduction, and some else more 
realistic and specific conditions. In this sense, we can consider the realistic 
factors as actual probabilistic causes of every element in S(x). 
Moreover, we can deem that the de-idealized and concretized factors 
could be causal factors in relation to the final states just in case that for all 
s(x) in S(x):
P(s(x) ⎸d(x), R(x)) ≠ P(s(x) ⎸d(x), R(x), f(x)),
where f(x) is the additional factor. In this case we can simply say that 
f(x) is causally relevant with respect to s(x). As we have seen in our example, 
the addition of a factor changes the probability distribution and, given that 
the process under question is an indeterministic process, the new probability 
function could increase or decrease the values of the different final states in 
S(x). We will say simply that f(x) is in the first case a positive probabilistic 
cause of s(x) and that f(x) is in the second case a negative probabilistic 
cause of s(x). We have seen that one and the same factor, assorting mating, 
is a positive cause of the homozygote genotypes and a negative cause of 
the heterozygote genotype. The probabilistic character of these two sorts 
of causes resides precisely in that they change the respective probabilities, 
whether increase or decrease its values. 
As our example also show, the attachment of a previous omitted factor 
into the lawlike statement can even change the domain of the probability 
function. That is the case of the mutation which introduces a new allele in a 
locus generating novel genotype. Finally, in all cases, the nomic or lawlike 
statement involved is reformulated because the inclusion of a causal factor 
changes the probability distribution itself. This suggest a close relationship 
between causes and probabilities: if we consider, as I do, the probability 
statements as expression of the degree of objective chance in indeterministic 
processes, we can say that there is an interplay between causes and chance. 
All the prior has the consequence that in order to be able to make causal 
claims about the processes within the domain of application of a scientific 
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theory, one must first to de-idealize the laws of the theory, so as to obtain 
more realistic and specific lawlike statements. If, according to our theoretical 
framework, included our philosophical conception of how the world is, we 
deem the factors incorporated in a nomic statement as causal factors, then 
we can think of them as factors that change the probabilities of the possible 
effects −that is, as causally relevant factors because they can increase or 
decrease the probabilities of its effects. It seems right to say in those cases 
that the processes are causally probabilistic. 
The fact that the causal factors do not determine a unique effect with 
probability equal to the unity, but rather that they allows us to assign 
only probabilities values between 0 and 1 to the possible effects of an 
indeterministic process means precisely that such factors are indeterministic 
causes of its aleatory effects. Whether a given cause increase or decrease 
the probability of a certain effect, that cause is a probabilistic cause of that 
effect. It becomes unnecessary that a certain cause rise the probability of 
an effect in order to be a probabilistic cause of that effect. It is required, 
first of all, as a minimal necessary condition that there are some factors that 
make possible the effects, in the sense that the corresponding conditional 
probabilities have a value greater than zero. When we are dealing with a 
genuine indeterministic process –a process which its possible effects have 
objective probabilities− we must, of course, consider its entire domain −i. e., 
the set of all its possible effects− in order to define a probability distribution. 
It is a mistake, among most authors, to take into account only one effect of a 
process and analyze its possible causes, whether positive or negative causes. 
The value of probabilistic notions on causality, such as the previous 
notions of positive and negative probabilistic causes, reside in part precisely 
in its application to processes which effects have not sufficient causes, effects 
that are aleatory such as the proportions of homozygotes and heterozygotes 
genotypes given a certain mating system, and the formation of an triton atom 
plus a proton given an interaction between two deuterons.
 Causal vs. probabilistic explanations
Humphreys has elaborated a realistic conception of probabilistic 
causality from an ontic view of causality and explanation, as opposed to 
epistemic or modal views. According to him, what explains a given event 
or phenomenon are other events or phenomena, its causes. A scientific 
explanation consist, thus, in a specification of the causes of the phenomenon 
to be explained, causes which ordinarily are multiple. Generally, the 
explanations are not complete because our knowledge of the causes of 
the phenomena that occur in the world is incomplete. However, this 
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incompleteness of our causal knowledge does not preclude causal claims 
to be true. (see 1989, p. 101). 
In order to a kind of events to be a cause of another kind of events it 
is necessary that the former exert invariably an influence to the latter. The 
invariable influences may be for or against to a certain kind of result or effect. 
Therefore there are, according to Humphreys, two kinds of causes, that he 
characterize as follow: “Let us, generalizing our principle, preliminarily 
characterize a factor X as a contributing cause of Y is and only if the 
occurrence of X results in an increased chance of Y, and characterize a factor 
Z as a counteracting cause of Y if and only if the occurrence of Z results in 
a decreased chance of Y.” (1989, p. 16). These two kinds of probabilistic 
causes can be applied to the indeterministic systems as well to deterministic 
cases where the effects have sufficient causes (see 1989, p. 101). Many 
events are the result of both contributing and counteracting causes. In such 
cases the manner to answer to the question “Why X happen?” is “X because 
Y despite Z”, where X is the explanandum, Y is a contributing cause, and Z 
is a counteracting cause.
Humphreys intends that his theory of causal explanation has applications 
in several sciences: social, medical and physical science. However, he 
admits the limits of his theory since it is unable to explain phenomena like 
the disintegration of uranium atoms. The causes, only the causes and all the 
causes explain the phenomena in the world, according to Humphreys, and 
chance do not explain anything (1989, pp. 112 and 118). As disintegration 
of uranium atoms occurs just by chance, that kind of phenomena has not 
explanation within his theory. 
From a causal realism, Humphreys maintain that only the causes, whether 
deterministic or probabilistic, are able to explain the events that happen in 
the world. Moreover, he argues that the probabilistic explanations, which 
consist in specifying the correct value of probability of the explanandum, 
are inappropriate because probability values lack of explanatory power: 
“This fact that probability values are epiphenomena of complete causal 
explanations indicates that those values have themselves no explanatory 
power, because after all the causal factors have been cited, all that is left is 
a value of sheer chance, and chance alone explains nothing.” (1989, p. 113).
 Salmon decline the condition of high probability of the explanandum 
statement of Hempel´s inductive-statistical model. The problem with this 
condition is obvious: it leaves without explanation abundant sorts of atomic 
processes which have low probabilities. Salmon argue that “If one and the 
same probability distribution […] provides explanations of two separate 
events, both explanations are equally valuable.” (1984, p. 89). As we can 
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see, Humphreys rejects this thesis about probabilistic explanation because 
for him only the causes can provide explanations: the probabilistic nomic 
statements derived from a scientific theory lack of explanatory power ⎼no 
matter its values⎼ because just the causes give explanations of the phenomena 
which happen in the world. 
In quantum mechanics, the theory provides probability values to 
a diversity of kinds of processes like fission, fusion, disintegration, 
annihilation, scattering and quantum jumps. Indeed, it is hard to think 
how we could explain anything in the quantum domain if one rejects, as 
Humphreys does, the probabilistic nomic statements of quantum theory as 
means to explain the quantum processes just on the ground that only causes 
have explanatory power. Some of the previous processes have a causal 
constituent. The interactions between two particles in fissions and fusions 
can be considered, in terms of Salmon´s theory of causality (1998), as causal 
interactions, in which both particles involved are transformed. In the case of 
disintegration and quantum jumps there are not such interactions and they 
occur spontaneously at random. However, there are some backward physical 
conditions −in the disintegration cases the instability of the radioactive 
elements−, which make possible those processes. The abandon of Hempel´s 
models of explanation do not entail to leave behind the paramount role that 
scientific laws have in explaining what happens in the world. 
I think the separation that Humphreys make between causes and chance 
is just an abstraction, an abstraction that if one try to apply to some scientific 
field, such as population genetics and quantum mechanics, do not make much 
sense. The main idea of the theories of probabilistic causality is precisely 
to think of events that happen in the world without sufficient causes, but 
rather with probabilistic causes, i. e., causes that produce its several effects 
only with some probabilities.
The fusion of the notions of causes and chance in some proposed 
concepts of probabilistic causality has been the key in the theories of 
probabilistic explanation. The basic idea is simply that some events produce 
other events probabilistically, as opposed to deterministically, and thus we 
are able to explain the latter in terms of the former. To show that an event 
is probable in virtue of the occurrence of some other event is part of the 
explanation of the former in terms of the latter. In this order of ideas, it is 
required that the events to be explained have a positive probabilistic value, 
high or low. We cannot expect to obtain the exact value of probability of the 
explananda events because this aim assumes that we are able to de-idealize 
totally the laws of science under the presupposition that our theories are 
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complete. This could be too complicated and implausible in many cases as 
our example of the principle of equilibrium of Hardy-Weinberg suggest. 
Let us return very briefly to the Humphreys´ thesis about the 
incompleteness of causal explanation. He says that: “If all the causal 
factors identified in the explanation are genuine causes of the explanation 
phenomenon, then that explanation is true. Whereas it is necessary to insist 
on the truth of an explanation, it is unwise insist upon its completeness, 
for to do so would rule out almost every explanation ever put forward of 
a natural phenomenon.” (1989, p. 112) So Humphreys´ maxima turns into 
“the causes, only the causes, yet not all the causes”. He is right not only 
for practical matters about the unfeasibility to obtain all the causes of a 
phenomenon in a complex and messy world, but for the complicatedness 
of de-idealizing all the factors involved in the law-like statements required 
to get a complete explanation.
Besides, the truth of a causal explanation of a singular event or 
phenomenon lies on that the causes cited in the explanation are genuine 
causes. How one can determinate whether a factor intervening in a process 
is a genuine cause or not? With respect to this, Humphreys demands that 
causal influences satisfy an invariance condition. Such invariances need to 
be expressed by general statements, which for him are causal laws. With 
respect to this he says: 
Aleatory explanation [explanation of aleatory phenomena] still requires 
laws to ground explanations, but reference to these laws does not appear 
directly in the explanations themselves, and they are not covering laws. 
The role that causal laws play here is a part of the truth conditions for 
the explanatory statement. In order for something to be a cause, it must 
invariantly produce its effect, and, hence there is always a universal law 
connecting cause and effect. The existence of such a law is therefore requi-
red for something truly to be a cause, but the law need be referred to only 
if it is questioned whether the explanatory material is true (1987, p. 114)
But this last thesis which grants to the causal laws a paramount role on 
explanation in detriment of theoretical laws drive in the inverse direction. 
Let me ask: What are the causal laws that connect invariantly the causes 
and its effects in quantum processes, which are stochastic processes, such 
as fusion and fission? For example, in the case of a fusion of two deuterons, 
2
1d + 21d, it is physically possible for a transformation to occur by either of 
two exclusive and exhaustive routes: the formation of a nucleus 32He, a light 
isotope of helium, plus a neutron, or the formation of a triton plus a proton. 
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Both results are about equally probable, according to quantum theory. What 
are the causal laws applying to this indeterministic process? The invariances 
required by Humphreys in this kind of cases between causes and effects can 
be just of probabilistic character, expressed by statements assigning a value 
to each of the two possible routes. Thus, it seems that we cannot be dispensed 
with probabilistic statements in order to explain stochastic processes, even 
to express that there is an invariable causal influence between two sorts of 
events which one thinks of as causes and effects. From quantum theory one 
can derive probabilistic nomic statements which assign probabilities values 
to the aleatory effects in all of the prior processes, and nothing else.  
Conclusions
In order to advance on the issue of probabilistic causality, the appropriate 
probabilistic statements that we must analyze are of the form P(S(x) ⎸R(x), 
F(x)), where x stand for a system in certain initial state (physical, biological 
or something else), R(x) is a set of realistic suppositions, F(x) is a class 
(possibly incomplete) of relevant factors previously omitted but which have 
been de-idealized or concretized and integrated to the formulation of the 
lawlike statement or model, and lastly, S(x) is the set of possible final states 
of the system x, given certain initial state, relatively to a theory T. 
It is of crucial importance to realize that if some factor in F(x) is modified 
or some neglected factor is incorporated to F(x), the entire probability 
function P changes, and new values are possibly assigned to all s(x) in 
S(x). This simple result have no place in the traditional treatments which 
(i) disregarded the idealized character of scientific laws, and (ii) generally 
analyzed statements of the form P(A ⎸C, Z) > P(A ⎸Z), which are not 
appropriate to indeterministic processes since they do not include an event 
A´ alternative to A, and possibly incompatible with it, that could occur under 
the same conditions C and Z. 
The significance of probabilistic notions on causality, such as the prior 
notions of positive and negative probabilistic causes, reside, in part, in its 
application to stochastic processes −processes which have not sufficient 
causes−, and thereby which effects are aleatory; effects like the proportion 
of the heterozygote genotype given certain mating system and the formation 
of a triton atom plus a proton given an interaction between two deuterons 
particles. By means of this sort of notions it could be plausible to construct 
models which give an account of some kind of indeterministic processes in 
terms of causes which produce its aleatory effects probabilistically. 
Nevertheless, the probabilistic notions on causality, like those of 
Humphreys, are not sufficient to elaborate a general conception of explanation 
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of indeterministic processes because some genuine stochastic, or aleatory, 
processes occur just by chance ⎼processes such as genetic mutations and 
quantum jumps⎼, and therefore they cannot be explained even in terms of 
probabilistic causes. Thus, if one rejects the probabilistic explanations ⎼the 
explanations of indeterministic processes in virtue of its probability values⎼ 
one leave those kinds of processes without explanation at all. 
As I have already said, one considers a given process as a causal 
process relatively to a general conceptual framework or to a global theoretic 
framework. As the other scientific claims about how the world is, the causal 
claims are provided from a given conceptual framework of a theory. Some 
philosophers have proposed what they call an ontic view on causality and 
explanation which are intended to be independent of the scientific theories. In 
this sense, Salmon, Humphreys and others who have proposed ontic theories 
of causality, seem think that one is able to say whether a given process is 
causal or not in an absolute manner, in a way which is no dependent of any 
scientific theory, but rather simply based on their own theories. I think this 
misunderstands the whole question about causality. 
We make causal claims assuming a philosophical or extratheoretic 
conception of the world which constitute the domain or application of the 
theory involved. We cannot maintain based on formulations of scientific laws 
that the processes involved, processes to which we apply these laws, are 
causal processes, because in general such laws are mathematical equations. 
Again, one can hold that a kind of process is causal from a philosophical 
view of how the world is, in a way relative to the theory studying the process 
in question. To hold that a causal claim is true involves that the theory from 
which one make such claim is true. Thus, is highly controversial to maintain 
that one can make true causal claims, from an ontic conception of causality, 
exempt from epistemic compromises. 
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